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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Terry Lin Smith appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentences for four 
counts of lewd conduct, one count of sexual battery on a minor child, one count of 
sexual abuse of a minor, and one count of forcible sexual penetration. On appeal, he 
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for forcible 
sexual penetration and that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On March 13, 2012, M.S. was sixteen years old and in the 10th grade at 
Timberline High School. (11/7/2012 Tr., p.319, L.16 - p.320, L.1.) Her tonsils were 
swollen and getting worse, so she sought medical treatment. (Id., p.323, L.20 - p.327, 
L.9.) Because she was a minor, the hospital contacted Smith, her father, who came 
and retrieved her. (Id., p.327, L.10 - p.328, L.12.) Smith was not pleased and 
grounded M.S. from her electronics and her friends. (Id., p.327, L.20 - p.329, L.4.) 
To get back her iPod later that night, Smith forced M.S. to perform sexual favors 
for him. (Id., p.329, L.25 - p.330, L.24.) Smith made his daughter strip off all of her 
clothing and began to rub her vagina with his fingers. (Id., p.332, Ls.1-21.) He then got 
a bottle of lubricant and, after putting on a blue latex glove, applied the lubricant to 
M.S.'s vagina. (Id., p.333, L.21 - p.335, L.9.) Smith stripped, put on a condom, and 
then, laying on his back, pulled his daughter up on top of him and rocked her back and 
forth, slightly penetrating her vagina with his penis, until he ejaculated. (Id., p.335, L.13 
- p.337, L.5.) Just wanting to get clean, M.S. then rolled off of him and went to the 
shower. (Id., p.337, Ls.9-22.) Smith followed her into the bathroom and flushed the 
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condom down the toilet. (Id., p.337, L.25 - p.338, L.3.) He then got into the shower 
with her, mixed a bottle of vinegar and water, and made her use it as a douche. (Id., 
p.338, L.4 - p.340, L.23.) 
That was M.S.'s breaking point. The next day at school she told her friend what 
had happened. (Id., p.342, Ls.14-25.) They went to the school counselor and reported 
the abuse. (Id., p.343, Ls.8-23.) Ultimately, they told a vice principal and a resource 
officer. (Id., p.343, L.24 - p.344, L.22.) M.S. was given a victim witness coordinator, 
who took her to be interviewed and examined by FACES. (Id., p.344, L.23 - p.346, 
L.2.) She was then placed in foster care. (Id., p.346, Ls.3-4.) 
That was not the first time Smith had sexually abused his daughter; the abuse 
had been recurrent since M.S. was in the fifth or sixth grade. (Id., p.343, Ls.1-7.) In 
sixth grade, while sharing a bedroom, Smith would touch M.S.'s vagina, lick her vagina, 
and occasionally penetrate her vagina with a rubber snake. (Id., p.349, L.3 - p.353, 
L.8.) She attempted to disclose the conduct but backed off when her father "guilt-
tripped" her. (Id., p.356, L.8 - p.360, L.7.) The frequency of the abuse then increased. 
(Id., p.360, L.20 - p.361, L.4.) Any time M.S. wanted to go to a friend's house or 
participate in school activities like dances, Smith made her perform sexual favors. (Id., 
p.363, L.6 - p.364, L.16.) The abuse began with manual to genital contact but, once 
M.S. entered 9th grade, it progressed to genital to genital contact. (Id., p.366, L.23 -
p.367, L.12; p.369, L.21 - p.370, L.16.) Smith would rub his penis on M.S.'s vagina 
until he ejaculated on her stomach. (Id., p.373, Ls.5-20.) He also groped her breast. 
(Id., p.374, Ls.7-21.) And, during the summer before 10th grade, he penetrated her 
vagina with his penis. (Id., p.376, L.24 - p.377, L.21.) 
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The grand jury indicted Smith with four counts of lewd conduct, one count of 
sexual battery on a minor child, one count of sexual abuse of a minor, and one count of 
forcible sexual penetration. (R., pp.25-28.) Smith pleaded not guilty and went to trial. 
(R., pp.82-84, 94-113.) At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on 
all counts. (R., pp.135-36.) The district court entered judgment against Smith and 
sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 20 years with ten years fixed on each count. 
(R., pp.146-50.) Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.155-57.) 
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ISSUES 
Smith states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Smith's conviction for unlawful 
penetration by a foreign object because there was insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was guilty of forcible sexual 
penetration? 
2. Has Smith failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to concurrent sentences of 20 years with ten years fixed on his four 
convictions for lewd conduct, and convictions of sexual battery of a minor child, sexual 




Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury's Conclusion That 
Smith Was Guilty Of Forcible Sexual Penetration 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Smith argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find him 
guilty of forcible sexual penetration. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Review of the trial 
record, however, demonstrates that the jury's verdict is supported by the substantial 
competent evidence presented at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003) (citation omitted). "On 
appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court is precluded from substituting its 
judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." ~ 
C. The Jury's Verdict Finding Smith Guilty Of Forcible Sexual Penetration Is 
Supported By The Evidence Presented At Trial 
The grand jury indicted Smith with the forcible sexual penetration of his daughter 
by inserting a rubber snake into her vagina when she was in the 6th grade. (R., p.27.) 
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Idaho Code § 18-6608, which criminalizes the nonconsensual penetration of the vagina 
or anus with a foreign object, then provided: 
Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal 
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or devise, against 
the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats of 
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of 
execution, or where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of 
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent, or where 
the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or 
anesthetic substance, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than life. 
I.C. § 18-6608 (2002). 1 In its recent opinion in State v. Elias, 157 Idaho 511, 337 P.3d 
670 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that this statute proscribed three 
means by which a defendant could commit the crime of forcible sexual penetration: 
The first is where the penetration is perpetrated against the victim's will by 
use of: (1) force; (2) violence; (3) duress; or, (4) threats of immediate and 
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. The 
second is where there is penetration and the victim is incapable of giving 
legal consent by reason of unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or 
permanent. The final means of committing the crime is by penetration 
when the victim has been prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, 
narcotic or anesthetic substance. 
kl at_, 337 P.3d at 674. 
The grand jury specifically indicted Smith with forcible sexual penetration under 
the theory that he had caused the penetration of M.S.'s vagina with the rubber snake 
"against her will by use of force." (R., p.27.) At trial, M.S. testified that in 2007 to 2008, 
while she was an 11 and 12-year-old child in 6th grade, Smith sexually abused her. 
1 This is the text of Idaho Code § 18-6608 under which Smith was convicted; the 
statute was amended in 2014. 
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(11/7/2012 Tr., p.320, Ls.9-19; p.348, L.5 - p.349, L. 1.) One of the ways he did this 
was by inserting a rubber snake into her vagina, usually while watching movies. (Id., 
p.350, Ls.7-11; p.352, L.17 - p.353, L.8.) Smith would spread her legs apart and then 
insert the snake into her vagina. (Id., p.353, L.9 - p.354, L.8.) This occurred anywhere 
between one and five times during her sixth grade year. (Id., p.353, L.18 - p.354, L.4.) 
That is sufficient evidence by which the jury could find the necessary elements of the 
crime. 
On appeal, Smith cites to the Court of Appeals' abrogated opinion in State v. 
Elias, Docket No. 39139, 2013 Op. No. 43 (Idaho App., July 12, 2013) and argues (1) 
that the state was required to show extrinsic force to sustain Smith's conviction and (2) 
that it failed to do so. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Because the Idaho Supreme Court 
took review of Elias and issued its own opinion, the Court of Appeals' opinion never 
became final and is not precedent. Even if the state had been required to meet an 
extrinsic force standard, M.S.'s testimony that Smith "move[d] her legs apart and put 
[the snake] in [her vagina]" (11/7/2012 Tr., p.353, Ls.12-17), and her testimony affirming 
that Smith "would push [M.S.'s] legs apart and insert the snake into [her] vagina" (id., 
p.354, Ls.5-8) meets that standard. Moving legs apart is not inherent in the act of 
inserting an object into another person's vagina or anus; it is therefore extrinsic. 
Sufficient competent evidence was presented at trial whereby the jury could 
reasonably conclude that Smith committed the crime of forcible sexual penetration by 
inserting a rubber snake into M.S.'s vagina against her will by use of force. Smith's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
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II. 
Smith Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Court's Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Smith argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court abused 
its discretion by imposing concurrent sentences of 20 years with ten years fixed on his 
four convictions for lewd conduct, and convictions of sexual battery of a minor child, 
sexual abuse of a minor, and forcible sexual penetration. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.) 
Smith has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing Concurrent 
Sentences Of 20 Years With Ten Years Fixed On Smith's Several Convictions 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
carry this burden, Smith must show that his sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is 
reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any 
or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole 
sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
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defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Considering the nature of Smith's crime, and his criminal history, his sentence is 
not excessive. In 2001 he was convicted of injury to a child for "spanking" his son on 
his buttocks, back, and thighs until his son had suffered significant bruising. (PSI, pp.5-
6.) A year after being released from probation in that case, Smith began sexually 
molesting his daughter. (Compare PSI, p.5 with 11/7/2012 Tr., p.320, Ls.14-16; p.347, 
L.1 - p.349, L.1.) His daughter was only 11 or 12 years old. (11/7/2012 Tr., p.347, 
Ls.1-12.) For five years she suffered both physically and emotionally at his hands, as 
she explained: 
... I feared all of the actions [Smith] did to me. I was always living in fear. I 
was always afraid to get anything or ask for anything for myself because in 
order to get stuff he made me do sexual things.... I would have to do 
sexual favors in order to go see [my friends].... I was always holding 
myself back-because I started thinking if I went outside or to a school 
function I would have to pay for it. So I didn't have any of the freedom as 
the other kids did. I never got to feel like I belonged in my family. I felt 
unwanted. 
(PSI, p.193.) 
In a highly detailed psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston found that Smith 
minimized his behavior and rationalized his actions. (PSI, p.136.) He displayed a 
deviant interest in his daughter when she was prepubescent and adolescent and failed 
to control his deviant urges. (Id.) The evaluator recognized that Smith was both an 
opportunistic offender and predatory. (PSI, pp.137, 163-65.) Most importantly, the 
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evaluator found that Smith was a moderate risk to reoffend (PSI, pp.136, 155-56) and 
would be less amenable to treatment (PSI, pp.137, 166-67). 
On appeal, Smith asserts that support from family and friends should have been 
given more weight in the district court's analysis. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) That 
Smith's family and friends have not abandoned him does not diminish the serious 
nature of his crimes nor the serious risk he presents to the community. Because Smith 
has failed to show that his concurrent sentences are excessive, he has failed to 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. His sentences should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Smith's conviction and 
concurrent sentences. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2015. 
-- /;/.~~ 
~-S-P_E_N_C-ER ____ _ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of March, 2015, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
(~ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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